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antitrust violation, and there is increasing recognition that firm behavior can negatively affect wages, restrict
worker mobility, and otherwise harm the interests of workers. Pretty much all the labor-related antitrust
litigation of the last 20 years has involved problematic agreements or arrangements among employers, from
which labor deserves protection.
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Summary: Antitrust in Labor Markets
Seminar by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp
Today, unlike in years past, labor is much more likely to be viewed as the victim and not the perpetrator
of an antitrust violation, and there is increasing recognition that firm behavior can negatively affect
wages, restrict worker mobility, and otherwise harm the interests of workers. Pretty much all the laborrelated antitrust litigation of the last 20 years has involved problematic agreements or arrangements
among employers, from which labor deserves protection.
LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY

MERGERS AND LABOR MARKET CONCENTRATION

Wage growth in the U.S. has not kept up with overall economic
growth. The causes of this wage stagnation are varied and most
have little or nothing to do with antitrust policy. These include the
introduction of technologies that reduce labor demand, federal
and state policies that negatively affect labor unions, outdated
minimum wage laws, and tax policies that promote investment
in capital over labor. But, as described in more detail below, there
are several anticompetitive firm practices that have become more
prominent and are contributing to labor market “monopsony.”
Monopsony (a monopoly on the buy-side of the market, rather than
the sell-side) in labor markets, whereby a small number of companies dominate hiring, is typically associated with reduced wages.
Arguably, antitrust law has not been effectively used to combat this
problem.

There is robust empirical literature on the relationship between
labor market concentration—the small number of employers hiring
in a certain job category—and suppression of wages. Consider, for
instance, a town where there are only two hospitals that employ
nurses and compete for their labor. If these two hospitals merge,
then suddenly, instead of having two employers competing for
nurses and their skills, there is only one. Wages in such a scenario
can be expected to go down. New research indicates that, on average, labor markets are highly concentrated, and the degree of labor
market concentration tends to be higher in smaller towns and more
rural areas. As a result, wages tend to be lower in these areas.

ANTI-POACHING AGREEMENTS
Anti-poaching agreements are arrangements between employers
to not hire away each other’s workers. Anti-poaching agreements,
which limit the ability of workers to move around in the job market,
are a per se violation of antitrust laws and can be a criminal
offense. For instance, in 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice and
the state of California filed a lawsuit against eBay, alleging the
firm participated in a handshake agreement with fellow Silicon
Valley giant Intuit to refrain from hiring one another’s employees.
Although eBay publicly insisted that the agreement did not lead
to anticompetitive effects, it settled the suit in 2014 and assented
to pay restitution for harm caused to individual workers and the
California state economy.

EMPLOYEE NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS

Employee non-compete agreements prohibit workers from leaving
one firm and then taking employment at another firm in the same
industry within a defined geographic range. Historically, non-compete agreements were used sparingly to protect companies from
“free riding,” whereby companies steal away employees trained at a
competitor’s expense, as well as loss of intellectual property rights.
Within the last 20 years, however, there has been more widespread
use of employee non-compete agreements, and they have been
migrating down the hiring chain to cover low-skilled employees, many of whom make around minimum wage. The fast food
franchise Jimmy John’s, for instance, was forced to stop making its
low-wage workers sign non-compete agreements in a legal settlement reached with the attorneys general of New York and Illinois.
Non-compete agreements significantly impair an employee’s mobility and thus the ability to seek out better wages.
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Figure 1: Labor Market Concentration by Commuting Zone

This figure depicts labor market concentration, using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a standard measure used by antitrust regulators. It shows the average
HHI by 6-digit Standard Occupational Classification code for the labor markets, between the first quarter of 2010 and the fourth quarter of 2013. HHI is equal to
the sum of the squares of the market shares of each firm in the market. In the construction of this figure, market shares are based on the share of job vacancies
posted by all the firms in that labor market, as reflected in data from CareerBuilder.com. The categories used for the HHI concentration levels are as follows—
Low: HHI between 0 and 1500; Moderate: HHI between 1500 and 2500; High: HHI between 2500 and 5000; Very High: HHI between 5000 and 10000. These
categories correspond to DOJ/FTC guidelines, except that we add the additional distinction between high and very high concentration levels around the 5,000 HHI
threshold. For more on the measurement of labor market concentration, see https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v6n3.php.

OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
Occupational licensing also can have anticompetitive effects. Licensing typically is instituted by professional organizations to help protect
consumers from harm and preserve the integrity of an industry—as with the requirement of the legal profession that practitioners have a law
license and that they pass the bar exam. In some instances, though, licensing seems to be nothing more than a mechanism for restricting the
ability of certain types of workers to enter an industry. For example: On June 17, 2010, the FTC filed a complaint alleging that the North Carolina
State Board of Dental Examiners (NCBDE) had broken the anticompetitive laws outlined by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Acting upon
complaints by dentists, the Board had issued cease-and-desist orders to non-dentists offering tooth whitening services and teeth whitening
products. These orders prompted cosmetologists, self-employed dental hygienists, and other non-dentists to stop offering teeth whitening
services in North Carolina, thereby reducing market competition. The case went to the Supreme Court and in 2015 the Court ruled 6-3 that
a Board can invoke state-action antitrust immunity only if it is subject to active supervision by the State, and in the North Carolina case that
requirement was not met.

CONCLUSION
There is no real closure on any of these labor market issues described above. All are moving targets still, and are statutory—which means that
Congress can change them to better protect the interests of labor, if it wants.
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